Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1

Introduction
Even the most autonomous central banks cannot, at times, escape conflict with government. Conflicts arise either because the government disagrees with the current stance of monetary policy, the central bank's outlook for future economic activity, or because the monetary authority might be critical of fiscal policy. Even the Bundesbank, a central bank that enjoyed a considerable degree of independence, according to all of the most widely circulated rankings, has not escaped conflict during its illustrious life.
1 Quantifying the degree of conflict over policy issues is, however, problematic. The political economy literature suggests that electoral and/or partisan factors are significant sources of conflict (see, for example, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) , and sources therein), especially if the central bank sees the need to implement a monetary policy that is tighter than the government wishes or is not loose enough in a period of recession.
There exists a body of empirical work that documents significant political influence on Bundesbank behavior (references are provided below). Others argue that the Bundesbank was largely able to avoid responding to political pressure by shielding itself behind the notion of institutional independence. Some of the differences in views have to do with the fact that a central bank cannot be independent from government but is best thought of as an autonomous institution within government. Indeed, politicians who drafted the 1957 Bundesbank Law (Deutsche Bundesbank 1957 were keenly aware of the fact that conflict between the government and the central bank could not entirely be eliminated (Lohmann 1998) . The difficulty at reaching a consensus about the significance of the impact of political pressure on the Bundesbank is partly 1 See, for example, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) , Burdekin, Wihlborg, and Willett (1992) , Alesina and Summers (1993) , Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1993) , and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) . 2 a reflection of the variety of ways in which politicians can, directly or indirectly, attempt to influence central bank behavior.
In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank that relies on the behavior of interest rate, exchange rate and money supply behavior, political influences both at the federal (Bund) and at the federal states (Länder) level, as well as by incorporating a novel element into the analysis. These determinants of the likelihood of conflict have their origin in the institutional environment given by the laws governing the Bundesbank. More precisely, the advisory and public communications activities of the Bundesbank on monetary and economic policy issues, as well as the influence of federalism on monetary policy, are key components to understanding Bundesbank behavior. Cukierman's (2000) theoretical model is used to motivate both the analysis and the empirical work. By specifying a variant of Rogoff's (1985) well-known conservative central banker model, Cukierman shows that the inflation bias is positively related to the likelihood that an economy is in a recession. The inflation bias is the principal source of conflict between the government and the central bank. Moreover, conflict seems more likely to take place when an economy is in a recession as the government, with one eye on the next election, may wish to confront the central bank on the stance of monetary policy currently being adopted. Similarly, a central bank may believe that its policy stance is appropriate and will eventually deliver the desired results while the government may be less patient than the conservative central banker prompting disagreement about the course of monetary policy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we discuss potential institutional sources of conflict between the Bundesbank and the federal government. Section 3 outlines the specification to be estimated, and the data employed. Section 4 describes the empirical evidence while section 5 concludes.
Sources of Conflict between the Bundesbank and the Federal Government
For the purposes of the present study three aspects of the laws governing the Bundesbank represent a potential source of conflict between the Bundesbank and the government in Germany.
First, until the European Central Bank came into being, the federal government could, at most, request that the Bundesbank defer, but not overturn, a monetary policy decision it disagreed with.
This power was never formally invoked. Thus, while the Bundesbank is "independent of instructions" from the federal government (Deutsche Bundesbank Act, section 12), it was expected to "support the general economic policy" of the government. No doubt such wording 2 From the monetary policy point of view this also implies that communication represents an instrument of monetary policy in addition to the conventional monetary policy instruments (Blinder et al. 2001; Siklos and Bohl 2004) .
3 For an analysis of conflicts between the Bundesbank and the government during the Bretton
Woods era see Berger (1997) , Berger and de Haan (1999) , and Berger and Schneider (2000) for the post-WWII period.
4 raised the probability of conflict between the federal government and the Central Bank Council, the body nominally responsible for implementing monetary policy, especially if the central bank takes seriously the task of commenting on fiscal policy matters. Nevertheless, the politicians who wrote the laws governing the Bundesbank understood the dangers inherent in establishing this kind of relationship between the Bundesbank and the political authorities, but in the end they felt that adequate institutional structures to entirely avoid such conflicts could not be properly designed (Kennedy 1991; Wahlig 1998 ).
The second noteworthy feature of the Bundesbank in Germany's political structure is that it is expected to provide advice to the federal government on "monetary policy matters of major importance" (Deutsche Bundesbank Act, section 13 The third element in the Bundesbank's institutional structure that needs to be highlighted, in the context of potential conflicts with the government, is the federal structure of German politics. While some authors have recently noted the relative importance of this feature (Kennedy 1991; Lohmann 1994 Lohmann , 1998 Berger and Woitek 1997; Vaubel 1997; Maier and de Haan 2000) , it remains under-emphasized in the wider discussion of central bank operations. This is somewhat surprising since federalism plays a significant role in political-economic discussions of the behavior of government agencies (e.g., Lijphart 1997 
Theoretical Motivation, Test Equation and Data
Cukierman (2000) This results in the following specification:
where 0 α is a constant, L a lag polynomial and t u a white noise error term. Our specification permits the likelihood of conflict to be affected by and affect the communications activities of the
are two-sided for reasons that will soon become apparent.
All time series used to estimate equation (1) To guard against the possibility that the results are somewhat sensitive to our preferred proxy for t K , we specify a [0,1] dummy variable using the political pressure index for Germany created by Maier, Sturm, and de Haan (2002) . This index adapts to German data the approach applied by Havrilesky (1995) given by Bundesbank representatives in a given month whose substance focuses on a particular topic. 13 An important but somewhat neglected literature points out that the monetary authority can communicate noisily, but effectively, via announcements. While Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Garfinkel and Oh (1995) use the example of a monetary target as the form of communication, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a) remark that their approach works equally well 12 The appendix to the Maier, Sturm, and de Haan (2002) paper provides the complete data set.
13 In Siklos and Bohl (2004) it is found that speeches dealing with inflation matter most in influencing the public's expectations. They considered separately speeches dealing with European Monetary Union, or other topics, but speeches dealing with inflation were most significant in the specifications. It has been suggested that speeches may not be a good proxy because they are planned far in advance. It is our understanding that while the timing of some speeches may be known in advance the precise content of speeches by the President is decided shortly before the speech is delivered. Hence, in almost every case, the speech covers a topic of present interest or concern to the central bank. example, typically higher when inflation is rising than when it is falling, as rising inflation ought to lead to temporarily higher real interest rates. 15 Similarly, conflict could be triggered when there 14 It is interesting to note that the structure of this publication changed dramatically soon after the birth of the European Central Bank. Relatively few speeches are now recorded, and there is no attempt to classify these according to the main topic of the speech. Instead, announcements from the European Central Bank as well as a few articles, mostly from the financial press, are now published.
15 This is the Taylor principle that underpins the well-known Taylor rule (Taylor 1993 R . Three lags are used for both interest rates in our specification. It seems preferable to rely on changes in interest rates as there is no reason to believe that one nominal interest rate level matters more for conflict than another. Instead it is the aggressiveness with which the central bank pursues its policies that is more likely to be a determinant of conflict.
Alternatively, one might consider the U.S.-German interest rate differential instead of changes in the U.S. Fed funds rate. Again, the conclusions are unaffected by this change. thereafter. Alternatively, following Johnson and Siklos (1996) , we also considered the possibility that political pressure on the monetary authorities might lead to a deferral of a necessary tightening of monetary policy until after an election, or an artificial loosening of policy which is then reversed after an election. In this case, the electoral dummy variable is active before an election with a value of + 1 as well as after the election with a value of -1 so that the sum is zero.
After experimenting with different formulations we set the electoral dummies active the election month and three months before the election denoted as In addition to the electoral variables, partisan influences are captured by discriminating between "left-wing" and "right-wing" governments at the state level. While a "right-wing" government was in power during the whole period under consideration "left-wing" governments at the state level are assigned a value of -1 and "right-wing" governments are assigned a value of + 1. As in case of the electoral variables we aggregated the dummies for the individual states to keep at a minimum the loss of degrees of freedom. 
Empirical Results
Turning to the estimation results of equation (1) we first report the findings using the recession dummy in 
, increase the probability of conflict between the Bundesbank and the federal government.
18 Deviations in money growth from published money targets ) 3 3 ( M M t − and two out of four parameters that capture the impact of the European exchange mechanism ( t ERM ) do not significantly affect the probability of conflict. 19 In addition, the coefficients on 18 In addition, we allowed for an asymmetric influence of positive versus negative changes of the domestic interest rates on the probability of conflict. We find (results are not shown but available on request) that the sum of positive changes in the interest rate had a bigger impact than the sum of the negative changes. However, F-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sum of positive coefficients minus the sum of negative coefficients is zero. 19 We leave the variables on deviations in money growth from the money targets and the European exchange mechanism in the results shown in Table 1 In order to provide evidence on the dynamic structure of the relationship between speeches and the probability of conflict we include, in addition to the contemporaneous variable As can be seen in column 4 and 5 in Table 1 related to government policies, this type of speeches is much more likely to raise the probability of a conflict compared to speeches on inflation. Moreover, due to the significance of 1 − t COM this category of speeches serves to anticipate the source of conflict that might erupt between the variable, we find that the money target variable is statistically significant in some specifications.
Second, as noted earlier, monetary targeting and the European exchange mechanism represented the centrepiece of the Bundesbank policy. 19 Bundesbank and the government. Lastly, the pseudo 2 R , and the log likelihood ratio statistics ( LR ), show that the variables included in all the regressions are jointly statistically significant. Table 2 rely on the Havrilesky index of political pressure adapted to the German experience by Maier, Sturm, and de Haan (2002) . In columns 2 and 3 we treat the call for both looser and tighter monetary policy as an indicator of conflict while in columns 4 and 5 only the call for tighter monetary policy are assumed to represent a source of conflict. The findings in Table 2 reinforce the main hypothesis of this paper. Most notably, more speeches by the Bundesbank President that deal with economic policy and inflation result in a higher probability of conflict. It is interesting to note that only the lead term for the communication variable is statistically significant which may reflect that the Bundesbank uses speeches to explain and justify monetary policy decisions. Also paralleling earlier results is the finding that lagged foreign interest rate changes contribute to the likelihood of conflict. Finally, note that money growth rates that exceed the target raise the probability of conflict only when calls for tighter monetary policy are considered. This likely reflects the view that higher monetary growth than expected will lead to more inflation, at least in the short-run, and hence to decisions to tighten monetary policy which increases the probability of conflict. Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of conflict t K based on the results in Table 1 System in 1992 and 1993 were additional significant sources of conflict while 1998 also saw a resurgence of conflict probabilities, perhaps related to the stability and growth pact and the 20 imminent introduction of the Euro. Generally, however, the probability of a conflict does not frequently exceed 50%. While conflicts are more likely in recessions, even after controlling for other factors, there is also evidence of a sharply rising likelihood of conflict at other times, notably when inflation rises sharply (e.g., the early to mid 1990s), or when important external events connected with the European Union take place. Therefore, whereas conflict with the federal government does take place on a regular basis, it is not a "constant" factor in the relationship between the Bundesbank and the federal government. During a month when an article calls for looser (-) or tighter (+) monetary policy by government officials or the ruling party the dummy is set equal to 1; it is zero otherwise.
The estimates in
# Whenever there was a call for looser policy only the dummy variable is set equal to 1; otherwise a zero is recorded.
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Figure 1: Speeches by the Bundesbank President and Inflation
Note: The vertical axis shows the number of speeches or the rate of inflation (monthly at annual rate in percent). 
